

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 OIC-04 CU-04 DRC-01 /155 W

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P R 191313Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6553

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 155

AMEMBASSY OSLO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA

USDOCOSOUTH

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 3895

OTTAWA ALSO: FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS)

1. SUMMARY. ON JUNE 18 SOVIET AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH MADE ONE OF HIS PERIODIC APPEARANCES BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY SECURITY TO ADMONISH DELEGATES OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON CBMS. MENDELEVICH MAINTAINED THAT SUCH LACK OF PROGRESS HAD CAST A DEEP SHADOW OVER ENTIRE CONFERENCE AND THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND THROUGH COMPROMISE TO COMPLETE THE WORK AT HAND. IN HIS FORTY MINUTE DISCOURSE MENDELEVICH OUTLINED THE SOVIET POSITION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, INDICATING SOME FURTHER MINOR CONCESSIONS ON A NUMBER OF POINTS. END SUMMARY.

2. MENDELEVICH APPEARED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE WITHOUT WARNING  
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ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 18 DURING A DEBATE ON THE EXCHANGE OF

OBSERVERS AT MILITARY MANEUVERS. FROM A PREPARED TEXT HE SAID THAT IT WAS ONCE AGAIN TIME TO REVIEW THE PROGRESS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND TO CHARACTERIZE ITS EFFORTS. DIFFERENCES IN THE APPROACH TO CBMS HAD PUT BRAKES ON THE PROGRESS OF REACHING COMPROMISE AND IN HIS VIEW ONLY ONE APPROACH COULD RESOLVE ISSUES THAT CONFRONTED THE SUBCOMMITTEE. SOME DELEGATIONS (WESTERN) APPROACHED CBMS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH WAS WRONG. THE SOVIET APPROACH IS AIMED AT REMOVING FEARS AND MISTRUST AND THAT WAS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. WITH THIS GENERAL INTRODUCTION, MENDELEVICH PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE THE SOVIET POSITION ON SPECIFIC POINTS.

3. USING THE MISTRUST THEME THROUGHOUT, MENDELEVICH SAID THAT MANEUVERS AT ARMY CORPS LEVEL IN BORDER AREAS WOULD CAUSE APPREHENSION, NOT DIVISION SIZE MANEUVERS. IF SOME SMALLER COUNTRIES WERE CONCERNED WITH MANEUVERS AT A LOWER LEVEL CONDUCTED BY A NEIGHBOR, THEN THEY COULD WORK OUT A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION. MOVING TO THE AREA FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION, MENDELEVICH MAINTAINED THAT NO STATE SHOULD FEAR MANEUVERS AWAY FROM THE BORDER AREA. CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS IN A BORDER AREA CREATED MISTRUST. A ZONE OF 50 KILOMETERS WAS A LARGE ENOUGH AREA. BUT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO INCREASE THIS TO ONE HUNDRED KILOMETERS IN A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE. MOREOVER, IN CERTAIN CASES INVOLVING NEIGHBORS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE AN EVEN LARGER AREA COULD BE ANNOUNCED.

4. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT THE TIME REQUIRED FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION COULD BE UP TO TEN DAYS. LETS AGREE ON TEN DAYS, HE SAID, THAT'S QUITE SUFFICIENT. ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS CLOSE. WITH REGARD TO WHOM SHOULD BE NOTIFIED, HE REPEATED SOVIET POSITION THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED OF MULTINATIONAL MANEUVERS AND NEIGHBORING STATES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED OF NATIONAL MANEUVERS.

5. MENDELEVICH THEN SAID THERE WERE SOME SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS SINCE THE TERRITORIES OF SOME PARTICIPANTS WERE LOCATED IN EUROPE AND ASIA AND THE CONFERENCE WAS ONLY CONCERNED WITH EUROPEAN TERRITORY.

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THERE WERE ALSO ISLAND STATES WHICH HAD NO BORDERS BUT IT WOULD NOT BE FAIR FOR SUCH STATES TO ANNOUNCE NOTHING. PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SITUATIONS HAD TO BE FOUND, BUT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE FOUND IN THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENT. HE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE SITUATION ON THE SOVIET/TURKISH FRONTIER IN ASIA AND SAID HIS DELEGATION WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS IN THAT AREA. TURKEY ALSO WOULD BE OBLIGED TO NOTIFY CYPRUS OF MANEUVERS IN

SOUTHERN TURKEY.

6. MENDELEVICH CONCLUDED BY SAYING LACK OF AGREEMENT ON CBMS HAD CAST A DEEP SHADOW OVER CSCE. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS AND TO REACH AGREEMENT THROUGH COMPROMISE. THIS MUST BE DONE AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS READY TO DO SO AND EVEN TO COPROMISE FURTHER. AS AN INDICATION OF THIS, HIS DELEGATION WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SPANISH PROPOSAL INVOLVING THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

7. BECAUSE OF THE LATE HOUR THE WEST RESPONDED BRIEFLY THROUGH NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR HUYDECOPER WHO GAVE A GENERAL REBUTTAL TO THE SOVIET APPROACH AND EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO REFLECT ON MENDELEVICH'S REMARKS.

8. COMMENT. MENDELEVICH'S LECTURE WAS NOT WELL RECEIVED BY EITHER THE NEUTRALS OR NATO DELEGATIONS. IT WAS VIEWED AS A CRUDE ATTEMPT TO FORCE AGREEMENT ON SOVIET TERMS AND TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. MOST DELEGATIONS CONSIDERED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE SOVIET PRESENTATION AGAIN DEMONSTRATED LACK OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON CBMS. END COMMENT. DALE

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